Why Is Russia So Big?

Why is Russia so big with little population?

Answer and Explanation: Russia’s population density is so low because much of the land in northern Russia is uninhabitable because it is frozen tundra. Although no one lives in this land, it is still taken into account when dividing the total population by total land area to find population density.

How is Russia the biggest?

Largest Countries in the World (by area) The largest country in the world is Russia with a total area of 17,098,242 Km² (6,601,665 mi²) and a land area of 16,376,870 Km² (6,323,142 mi²), equivalent to 11% of the total world’s landmass of 148,940,000 Km² (57,510,000 square miles). See also:

What does Russia do with all that land?

Climate – Russia experiences extreme temperatures in winter and summer, and summer precipitation is low. Many regions of Russia experience six months of snow cover each year and in these places the subsoil can often be frozen permanently, The most fertile regions are in the southern parts of the country between Kazakhstan and Ukraine called chernozem (“black earth”) in Russian.

Is most of Russia uninhabitable?

However, large parts of Russia are uninhabited or uninhabitable because permafrost (soil that remains frozen throughout the year and is unsuitable for agriculture) covers more than 60% of Russia’s territory.

Why Russia has more females?

Why are there more women than men in Russia? One of the factors explaining gender imbalance in modern Russia is the gap in average life expectancy between genders. In 2021, Russian women outlived men by close to 10 years. In particular, working-age men were six times more likely to die from external causes of death.

What is the male to female ratio in Russia?

The Gender Ratio of Russia (2018 – 2026, Males per 100 Females) – Explore Russia’s latest macroeconomic trends and forecasts to inform business strategy and pinpoint opportunities and risks Visit Report Store Gender Ratio in Russia The gender ratio in Russia attained a value of 86 males to 100 females in 2021.

The ratio recorded a year-on-year increase of 0.02% in 2021. Between 2018-2021, the gender ratio in Russia increased by 0.07%. The number of males per 100 females in the country was highest in the year 2021 and lowest in the year 2018. Gender Ratio Gender ratio means the number of females per 1,000 males in each population.

The gender ratio is an important characteristic that helps us to study the population of a given area. An unfavorable gender ratio means that there is a lower number of females per 1,000 males in the population. Practices like female foeticide, killing of girls in the womb, female infanticide, killing of girls when they are babies and domestic violence towards women due to gender discrimination led to unfavorable gender ratio.

Countries like India Pakistan Afghanistan China and Saudi Arabia have low gender ratios. This ratio isn’t constant, rather, it’s influenced by influences in biology, society, technology, culture, and economics, which in turn affects society, demography, and the economy as well as the gender ratio itself.

Gender Ratio: Global Scenario According to GlobalData, the top ten countries in 2021 with the highest gender ratio in the world are Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Maldives, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Equatorial Guinea, Bhutan, and The Northern Mariana Islands.

• The countries with the lowest gender ratio in 2021 include Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Nepal, Hong Kong, and Curacao.
• The average gender ratio was 101 males for 100 females globally in 2021.
• In 2021, the male population was 3.97 billion of the world’s population, or 50.42% of the total.

The global female population was 3.9 billion in the globe, accounting for 49.58% of the total population. There were 65.51 million more men than women on the globe in 2021. Factors that Affect Gender Ratio:

Discrepancies between men and women’s death rates and life expectancy, In general, women live longer than males. This means that assuming everything else is equal, it can be anticipated that women will make up somewhat more than half of the population Biological gender ratios are not equal. Male births outnumber female births in all nations. This means that assuming everything else is equal, it can be anticipated that men will make up somewhat more than half of the population The population’s gender distribution can be impacted through migration. All else being equal, if there is a considerable quantity of imported male-dominated labor in some countries, it can be anticipated that men will make up most of that labor

How did Russia get all that land?

Peter the Great – Peter I, called “Peter the Great” Peter the Great (Peter I, 1672–1725) brought centralized autocracy into Russia and played a major role in bringing his country into the European state system. Russia was now the largest country in the world, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

The vast majority of the land was unoccupied, and travel was slow. Much of its expansion had taken place in the 17th century, culminating in the first Russian settlement of the Pacific in the mid-17th century, the reconquest of Kiev, and the pacification of the Siberian tribes. However, a population of only 14 million was stretched across this vast landscape.

With a short growing season, grain yields trailed behind those in the West and potato farming was not yet widespread. As a result, the great majority of the population workforce was occupied with agriculture. Russia remained isolated from the sea trade and its internal trade, communication and manufacturing were seasonally dependent.

1. Peter reformed the Russian army and created the Russian navy,
2. Peter’s first military efforts were directed against the Ottoman Turks,
3. His aim was to establish a Russian foothold on the Black Sea by taking the town of Azov,
4. His attention then turned to the north.
5. Peter still lacked a secure northern seaport except at Archangel on the White Sea, whose harbor was frozen nine months a year.

Access to the Baltic was blocked by Sweden, whose territory enclosed it on three sides. Peter’s ambitions for a “window to the sea” led him in 1699 to make a secret alliance with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Denmark against Sweden resulting in the Great Northern War,

The war ended in 1721 when an exhausted Sweden sued for peace with Russia. Peter acquired four provinces situated south and east of the Gulf of Finland, thus securing his coveted access to the sea. There, in 1703, he had already founded the city that was to become Russia’s new capital, Saint Petersburg,

Russian intervention in the Commonwealth marked, with the Silent Sejm, the beginning of a 200-year domination of that region by the Russian Empire. In celebration of his conquests, Peter assumed the title of emperor, and the Russian Tsardom officially became the Russian Empire in 1721.

• Peter re-organized his government based on the latest Western models, molding Russia into an absolutist state.
• He replaced the old boyar Duma (council of nobles) with a Senate, in effect a supreme council of state.
• The countryside was also divided into new provinces and districts.
• Peter told the senate that its mission was to collect taxes.

In turn tax revenues tripled over the course of his reign. Administrative Collegia (ministries) were established in St. Petersburg, to replace the old governmental departments. In 1722, Peter promulgated his famous Table of ranks, As part of the government reform, the Orthodox Church was partially incorporated into the country’s administrative structure, in effect making it a tool of the state. Russian victory at Battle of Poltava By then, the once powerful Persian Safavid Empire to the south was heavily declining. Taking advantage, Peter launched the Russo-Persian War (1722–1723), known as “The Persian Expedition of Peter the Great” by Russian histographers, in order to be the first Russian emperor to establish Russian influence in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region.

After considerable success and the capture of many provinces and cities in the Caucasus and northern mainland Persia, the Safavids were forced to hand over the territories to Russia. However, by 12 years later, all the territories were ceded back to Persia, which was now led by the charismatic military genius Nader Shah, as part of the Treaty of Resht and Treaty of Ganja and the Russo-Persian alliance against the Ottoman Empire, the common neighbouring rivalling enemy.

Peter the Great died in 1725, leaving an unsettled succession, but Russia had become a great power by the end of his reign. Peter I was succeeded by his second wife, Catherine I (1725–1727), who was merely a figurehead for a powerful group of high officials, then by his minor grandson, Peter II (1727–1730), then by his niece, Anna (1730–1740), daughter of Tsar Ivan V,

Why did Russia sell Alaska?

NOTE TO READERS “Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations” has been retired and is no longer maintained. For more information, please see the full notice, The purchase of Alaska in 1867 marked the end of Russian efforts to expand trade and settlements to the Pacific coast of North America, and became an important step in the United States rise as a great power in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beginning in 1725, when Russian Czar Peter the Great dispatched Vitus Bering to explore the Alaskan coast, Russia had a keen interest in this region, which was rich in natural resources and lightly inhabited. As the United States expanded westward in the early 1800s, Americans soon found themselves in competition with Russian explorers and traders.

St. Petersburg, however, lacked the financial resources to support major settlements or a military presence along the Pacific coast of North America and permanent Russian settlers in Alaska never numbered more than four hundred. Defeat in the Crimean War further reduced Russian interest in this region. Signing of the Alaska Treaty, 1867 Russia offered to sell Alaska to the United States in 1859, believing the United States would off-set the designs of Russia’s greatest rival in the Pacific, Great Britain. The looming U.S. Civil War delayed the sale, but after the war, Secretary of State William Seward quickly took up a renewed Russian offer and on March 30, 1867, agreed to a proposal from Russian Minister in Washington, Edouard de Stoeckl, to purchase Alaska for $7.2 million.

The Senate approved the treaty of purchase on April 9; President Andrew Johnson signed the treaty on May 28, and Alaska was formally transferred to the United States on October 18, 1867. This purchase ended Russia’s presence in North America and ensured U.S. access to the Pacific northern rim. For three decades after its purchase the United States paid little attention to Alaska, which was governed under military, naval, or Treasury rule or, at times, no visible rule at all.

Seeking a way to impose U.S. mining laws, the United States constituted a civil government in 1884. Skeptics had dubbed the purchase of Alaska “Seward’s Folly,” but the former Secretary of State was vindicated when a major gold deposit was discovered in the Yukon in 1896, and Alaska became the gateway to the Klondike gold fields.

Is Russia bigger than the rest of Europe?

Europe is approximately 10,180,000 sq km, while Russia is approximately 17,098,242 sq km, making Russia 68% larger than Europe. This to-scale comparison of Europe vs. Russia uses the Mercator projection, which distorts the size of regions near the poles. Learn more, Note: Try dragging the outline to reposition.

Why does the world rely on Russia?

For much of the past year, and since his invasion of Ukraine last February, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been riding high on his supposed energy omnipotence, holding the global economy hostage to his whims. Since last summer, Putin has choked off natural gas supplies to Europe, hoping that Europeans, shivering and without heat during the winter, would turn on their leaders and make it politically infeasible to continue support for Ukraine.

1. For much of the past year, and since his invasion of Ukraine last February, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been riding high on his supposed energy omnipotence, holding the global economy hostage to his whims.
2. Since last summer, Putin has choked off natural gas supplies to Europe, hoping that Europeans, shivering and without heat during the winter, would turn on their leaders and make it politically infeasible to continue support for Ukraine.

The threat was potent: In 2021, a whopping 83 percent of Russian gas was exported to Europe. Russia’s total global exports of 7 million barrels of oil a day and 200 billion cubic meters (bcm) of piped gas a year accounted for about half of its federal revenue.

• Even more importantly, Russia’s commodities exports played a crucial role in global supply chains: Europe was reliant on Russia for 46 percent of its total gas supply, with comparable levels of dependence on other Russian products including metals and fertilizer.
• Now, as we approach the one-year anniversary of Putin’s invasion, it is apparent that Russia has permanently forfeited its erstwhile economic might in the global marketplace.

Thanks to an unseasonably warm winter in Europe, Putin’s moment of maximum leverage has passed uneventfully, and, as we correctly forecast last October, the biggest victim of Putin’s gas gambit was Russia itself. Putin’s natural gas leverage is now nonexistent, as the world—and, most importantly, Europe—no longer needs Russian gas.

• Far from freezing to death, Europe quickly secured alternative gas supplies by pivoting to global liquefied natural gas (LNG).
• This included an estimated 55 bcm from the United States, two-and-a-half times more than prewar U.S.
• Exports of LNG to Europe.
• Coupled with increases in supply from renewable sources, nuclear, and, in the interim, coal, these alternative supplies have reduced Europe’s dependence on Russian gas to 9 percent of its total gas imports.

In fact, Europe now purchases more LNG than it ever purchased Russian gas. Furthermore, Europe’s unseasonably warm winter means that not only have the worst-case scenarios been avoided, but Europe’s full storage tanks have barely been drawn down and can carry over into next winter.

In January, German storage tanks were a record 91 percent full, up from 54 percent last year, meaning that Europe will need to buy significantly less gas in 2023 than in 2022. The implications are tremendous. Europe is now assured sufficient energy supply well into 2024 at a minimum, providing enough time for cheaper alternative energy supplies—both renewables and bridge fuels—to be fully onboarded and operating within Europe.

This includes the completion of an additional 200 bcm/year in LNG export capacity by 2024—enough to fully and permanently replace Russia’s 200 bcm/year gas exports once and for all. Furthermore, the days of globally expensive energy amid “Russia-driven supply squeezes” are over for good.

In addition to Europe’s lower expected demand for LNG, China is pivoting away from global LNG in favor of domestic sources. Coupled with the rapidly increasing LNG supply, it is little surprise that the gas futures market is now pricing gas to be cheaper than prewar levels for years to come. Putin, on the other hand, has zero remaining leverage and no way to replace his erstwhile primary customer; he is finding out the hard way that it is much easier for consumers to replace unreliable commodity suppliers than it is for suppliers to find new markets.

Already, Putin is drawing practically no profit from gas sales, as his prior 150 bcm sales of piped gas to Europe have been replaced by a measly 16 bcm to China and pocket change in global LNG sales, barely enough to cover expenses. There are no markets for Putin to replace anything close to that 150 bcm shortfall: China lacks the necessary pipeline capacity to take any more for at least a decade and prefers domestic and diversified sources of energy anyhow, while Russia’s laggard technology makes it impossible to scale LNG exports beyond a slow trickle.

Putin’s oil leverage is likewise diminishing. Gone are the days when fear of Putin taking Russian oil supplies off the market caused oil prices to skyrocket by 40 percent over two weeks. In fact, when—in response to last month’s rollout of the G-7 oil price cap, which we helped develop—Putin announced a ban, from Feb.1, on oil exports to countries that accepted the price cap, oil prices actually went down,

Why? Because it is now apparent that the world no longer depends on Putin’s oil. The oil market is turning to favor buyers, not sellers, amid increasing supply—more than enough to compensate for possible drops in Russian crude production. (In December, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told Russian media that the government was prepared to cut crude production by up to 700,000 barrels in 2023.) Oil prices are lower now than before the war, and in the second half of 2022 alone, there was a surge of supply by 4 million barrels a day from producers such as the United States, Venezuela, Canada, and Brazil.

With even more new supply expected this year, any lost Russian crude will be seamlessly and easily replaced within weeks. And this time, Putin cannot coerce Saudi Arabia to ride to the rescue by drastically cutting OPEC+ production quotas as it did last October. That’s because the United States is now pausing crucial Saudi arms and technology transfers amid heightened international scrutiny of OPEC+’s significant surplus unused capacity.

Putin’s leverage has also evaporated because the G-7 price cap gives him a lose-lose choice, which erodes Russia’s energy position no matter what he does. China and India, without explicitly participating in the cap, are leveraging it to drive a hard bargain with Russia, with discounts of up to 50 percent, so even though India is buying 33 times more Russian oil than it was a year ago, Russia is not making much profit, given its $44 break-even cost of production on top of costlier transportation,

But if Putin cuts production even more, as he has threatened to do, he will be forfeiting all-important oil market share, long a Putin obsession, amid an increasingly oversupplied oil market and further cutting into his own revenue when he is already starved for cash, Even Putin’s other commodities cards are all used up.

His gambit to weaponize food abjectly collapsed when even his nominal allies turned on him. And in certain metals markets where Russia historically dominated, such as nickel, palladium, and titanium, blackmail-fearing buyers combined with higher prices have expedited reshoring and reinvigorated dormant public and private investment in critical mineral supply chain and mining projects.

These are mostly in North and South America and Africa, home to many undertapped mineral reserves. In fact, in several crucial metals markets, such as cobalt and nickel, the combined output of new mines to be opened in the next two years adds up to more than enough supply to replace Russian metals within global supply chains permanently,

Putin’s failed economic gambits are yet another set of miscalculations to add to an increasingly long list, from his underestimation of the people of Ukraine to his underestimation of the collective unity and willpower of the West. Of course, Putin’s failed economic and energy warfare has not been without consequence.

1. The spillovers have impacted many lives, transformed supply chains, changed trade flows, and consumers still feel the pinch of higher prices as the newfound lower prices take some time to work through the economy.
2. But what matters is that the end is in sight.
3. Never again will Putin be in a position to cause such chaos and disturbance in the global economy, because he has permanently weakened Russia’s most powerful hand—its energy and commodities might—beyond repair.

The war on the battlefield is still being fought, but on the economic front at least, victory is in sight,

Who does Russia rely on?

There’s a lot of talk about Europe’s dependency on the Russian economy – especially the flow into Europe of oil, gas, grains, and some gases like neon. While it is important for Europe to break this dependency, there is an undercurrent in some of the commentary about trade dependencies between the EU and Russia that suggests the escalation of sanctions to hit Europe harder than Russia.

1. This is not correct.
2. Europe has had some trade sanctions against Russia since 2014, when the country first invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea.
3. This sanctions programme altered European exports and reduced its size.
4. Europe’s exports of goods to Russia in 2021 was about 89 billion euro compared with 118 billion euro ten years prior.

EU countries that are proximately close to Russia were then affected not just by EU sanctions but also Russia’s counter sanctions, for instance of agricultural products. But they weathered the storm quickly. For instance, Estonia’s exports of dairy products to Russia dropped by 66 percent between 2013 and 2014.

1. However, the country’s exports of dairy products to other countries went up, leading to only a 1 percent decline in total dairy exports in that year,
2. A macro analysis of EU-Russia trade tells a different story about general dependencies.
3. Obviously, the new sanctions will hurt the global economy.
4. Russia is a global exporter of commodities that are traded globally, and the Russian invasion has already pushed up prices of many raw materials and agricultural commodities,

There are products in which a significant supply comes from Russia, and which needs to be found somewhere else. As Poland prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki learned from its Australian counterpart when trying to replace Russian coal with coal coming from Australia, these adjustments take some time and require additional resources.

1. There is also a lesson here: the concentration of market power in the production of any product carries geopolitical risks.
2. Uncoupling the Russian economy from the West will have costs but they will hit the Russian economy far, far harder.
3. In 2020, less than 2 percent of EU total exports and imports went and came from Russia while for the Russian economy this percentage was equal to 34 percent.

This difference alone shows how asymmetrical the economic effects of the sanctions will be. Add to that the geographical scope of the sanctions. Many countries are sanctioning Russia, leaving it with few chances to reallocate its total trade, while the sanctions only affect a small portion of Europe’s total trade.

• It is one thing to find new trading partners for 2 percent of your total trade.
• It is a totally different thing to find substitutes for one third of your total trade.
• The effects of the Western sanctions on the Russian economy are proof that the Russian economy is much more intertwined with the West than most people think.

Russian imports of goods and services as a percentage of its GDP were 21 percent in 2020, lower than the OECD average (26%) but larger than India (19%), China (16%), Brazil (15%), and the United States (13%). The EU is Russia’s main supplier of foreign goods, accounting for 34 percent of Russian total imports, significantly more than China which represents 24 percent.

1. The EU and the US together supply 40 percent of Russian total imports.
2. As a result of the trade and financial sanctions, and the associated financial and reputational risks that now come with any transaction with a Russian entity, this trade is rapidly shrinking to a fraction of what it was.
3. Figure 1 below shows Russian imports broken down by economic sector and its value as a percentage of Russia GDP between 2010 and 2020.

The data shows that Russia’s main imports are machinery, chemicals, and other manufacturing goods, and that Russia depends on the rest of the world for the supply of many complex products. One factor explaining Russia’s sectoral trade profile and dependency is its poor labour productivity. Source: UNCOMTRADE, World Bank, authors’ calculations. Moreover, Russia’s dependency on the West’s manufacturing capacity – particularly European – is shown in the value that foreign businesses add to the Russian economy. Four of every ten dollars of Russian demand for manufacturing goods came from outside Russia and the EU alone contributed 14 percent to Russian’s total demand of manufacturing goods.

In comparison China – the factory of the world – added 9 percent. To pay for these imports, Russia exports minerals, oil, and gas. In 2020, exports of these products represented 59 percent of Russian total exports while Russian exports of machinery and chemicals were 5 percent and 6 percent respectively.

Russia’s trade profile is one in which Russia exports minerals, oil, and gas and imports manufacturing products. The effect of the sanctions in the Russian economy will be felt sector by sector as Russian companies stop receiving foreign products, technology, and expertise.

• Many imported products are relatively sophisticated, which will make finding alternative suppliers much more difficult.
• The Russian economy relies heavily on EU and US companies for many imported products.
• In 2020, there were 1,716 product categories (out of 4,385) with a value of €57 billion (28 percent of Russian total imports) for which at least half of Russia’s imports came from the EU and the US.

Figure 2 plots each individual product category for which EU and US businesses supply at least 50 percent of Russian imports. The size of the bubbles corresponds to the value of the products. Some of the most important product categories were medicines, vehicles parts, IT components, machinery’s parts like valves and pipes, and iron and steel.

Figure 2 also shows that for some product categories, Russia’s dependency on the EU and the US is much higher than 50 percent. There were €22 billion of Russian imported products for which 75 percent came from the EU and the US, €7 billion for which this ratio was 85 percent, and €2 billion for which more than 95 percent of Russian imports were sourced from the EU and the US.

In comparison, there were only ten product categories (out of 9,000) with a value of €8 billion (0.5 percent of EU imports) that the EU buys mostly from Russia – and half of the import value of these products were oil and gas. Figure 2: Russian imported product with half or more of imported value sourced from the EU and the US (2020) Source: UNCOMTRADE, authors’ calculations. Understanding Russian import dependency, the number of product categories, and value of these products that Russia imports from the EU and the US is crucial to appreciate the economic shock to the Russian economy.

Can a foreigner buy land in Russia?

Real estate purchase regulations in Russia – According to Russian law, foreigners are usually allowed to purchase or rent property in Russia, but certain exceptions apply. Also, in order to be allowed to buy a property, the foreign citizen must hold a valid Russian resident permit,

1. The Russian Land Code stipulates that foreign people or foreign legal entities cannot own properties built on borderline zones.
2. Foreigners also have restrictions regarding the purchase of agricultural land in Russia,
3. When searching for a property in Russia, foreigners are advised to seek the help of a specialized real estate agency.

This minimizes the risks and protects the buyer from fraud. Our attorneys in Russia can recommend real estate agencies in Russia and inform you during the purchase procedure, to make sure that everything is done according to law.

Is most of Russia unexplored?

Abstract – UNDER this title M. Venoukoff has just published an interesting paper on those parts of Europe and Asia which remain yet unexplored. It is not to be wondered at that the name of Europe should be among incompletely explored parts of the world, as there are even in Europe considerable spaces, especially in the Balkan peninsula and in North-Eastern Russia, which await scientific exploration.

1. The war of 1877-78 certainly afforded occasion for surveying and mapping wide spaces in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, but the geography of Macedonia, Epirus, and even of Thessaly is far from being exact.
2. In Russia all the northern provinces, from the Norwegian frontier to the Ural Mountains are only known superficially; we know here only the coast and the three principal rivers—the Onega, the Dwina, and the Petchora.

The great Samoyede tundra remains quite unexplored. Notwithstanding several journeys in the Northern Ural, this country is little known, and the interior of the great double island of Novaya Zemlya remains quite unknown, both affording, however, a very great interest, especially for geologists.

As to the hydrographical exploration of the Kara Sea and of the Arctic Ocean north of Siberia, M. Venoukoff does not give them much of importance, notwithstanding what he terms the pompous newspaper writing about the trade with Northern Siberia, and he thinks that there are on the Asiatic continent several places far more interesting for explorers.

For instance, Chekanovsky’s and Nordenskjöld’s explorations have quite changed our ideas on the geography of that land, twice as wide as France, which belongs to the basins of the Khatanga and of the Anabara. It would be a rich field of exploration for a bold traveller.

• The lands east from the Lena remain quite unknown, and the northern slopes of the Stanovoi Mountains are still a tabula rasa ; the sources of the Indighirka, Kolyma, Omolon, Aniouy, and Ghijiga rivers were never visited by Europeans, and Wrangel mapped them only from hearsay.
• The land of the Chukchis is better known, thanks to the work of the explorers of the last century, to the recent Russian expeditions, and to Nordenskjöld’s information; but all our knowledge of this country is far from being exact, and Europeans have never penetrated to the interior of the peninsula which separates the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific, and which promises to have a future as a meeting-point for the whalers, as well as for the trade in mammoth bones.

The land of the Koriaks is less attractive, except for a naturalist. As to Kamchatka, certainly it is passably well known, but what a mass of work remains to be done in mapping the west coast, preparing a map of the interior, studying the most interesting geology, botany, and ethnography of the peninsula! Further south we see that the northern part of Sakhalin remains quite unexplored; the Sikhota-alin Mountains are all but unknown; and the regions between the Ussuri and Sungari Rivers, the sources of the Nonni and Argoun Rivers promise very much to the naturalist and to the geographer who would study them.

The interesting peninsula of Corea will certainly be explored as soon as access to it is not forbidden to Europeans. In the Chinese Empire there are spaces as wide as England which remain unexplored. As to Eastern and Northern Thibet we are not yet sure as to what is the true source of the Brahmaputra and of the Irawaddi, and what is the importance in the orography of this land of the Kuen-Lun range.

The inaccessible deserts of Eastern Turkestan are as deserving of exploration as Thibet, and the reaching of the sources of the Hoang-ho is one of the desiderata of geographical science. The great desert of Gobi is passably well explored, but still there remains an important problem: Does there exist, under the 42° and 43° N.

lat., a chain of mountains which crosses the desert and unites the eastern Thian-Shan with the In-Shan Mountains? In northern Mongolia there still remain unknown the highlands at the upper parts of the Selenga River. In China proper there is certainly no room for geographical discoveries, but there remains very much to do as to astronomical determinations, and the substitution of a true picture of nature for the hypothetical chains of mountains which cover our maps.

Useless to speak of what might be done with regard to the ethnography of Western and South-Western China. A most attractive exploration would be certainly that of Indo-China in all directions, but it is to be feared that such an exploration will remain for a long time a simple dream, because of the political institutions of this terrestrial paradise.

1. But the exploration of Siam and Annam is one of the most necessary geographical desiderata,
2. Without speaking of the Asiatic islands, where so much remains to do, M.
3. Venoukoff points out that British India is certainly one of the best explored countries in the world, and that several parts of Europe are far behind India as to our geographical knowledge of them; but it is not the case as to those countries which are situated to the north-west of India.

Afghanistan and Beluchistan await explorers, especially for certain, perhaps the most important, parts of them, as well as Southern Turkestan and the land of the Turkomans, where so much remains to do. Khorassan and Western Persia are quite well known, but Iran remains unknown; of course the exploration of these deserts, as well as of those of the interior of Arabia, would afford very great difficulties and give comparatively few scientific results.

How much of Russia is untouched?

Status and trends of biodiversity, including benefits from biodiversity and ecosystem services – The content of this biodiversity profile is still draft. The text below has been prepared by SCBD and remains subject to final approval by the Party concerned.

1. The Russian Federation occupies a vast territory (17 million km2), making it the world’s largest country in terms of area.
2. The ecosystems of Russia are very diverse, including polar deserts, tundra, forest tundra, taiga, mixed and broad-leaved forests, forest steppe, steppe, semi-desert and subtropics.

The northern ecosystems of tundra and taiga dominate the country’s territory. Russian soils are equally diverse, ranging from arctic soils in the north to brown semi-desert soils and yellow subtropical soils in the south. Russian forests cover 776.2 million ha, accounting for about 22% of the world’s forest resources and 40% of the most valuable coniferous stands.

• Russian forests and peatlands are the main terrestrial regenerators of oxygen.
• Russia also possesses the largest wetland systems in the world.
• Peatlands and marshes occupy 1.8 million km2 and perform a key role in carbon sequestration.
• Combined with lakes, wetlands cover 15% of the territory and are connected by 120,000 rivers.

About 80% of Arctic species are represented in Russia. The country is bordered by 13 marginal seas of three oceans (Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific), with a coastline stretching some 60,000 km, making it the longest of any country in the world. Sixty-five percent of the territory is considered virtually untouched by economic and other human activities, whereas 20% of the territory has suffered considerably due to human impact.

• Russian biodiversity includes 12,500 species of vascular plants (representing 5% of the world’s vascular flora), 2,200 species of bryophytes, about 3,000 species of lichens, 7,000-9,000 species of algae, and 20,000-25,000 species of fungi.
• Russian fauna is composed of 320 species of mammals (representing 18% of the world’s mammal fauna), over 732 species of birds (representing 8% of the world’s bird fauna), 75 species of reptiles, about 30 species of amphibians, 343 species of freshwater fish (high endemism), approximately 1,500 species of marine fishes (representing only around 3% of the world’s fish fauna), 9 species of cyclostomates and approximately 100,000 invertebrates (high endemism).

The fish fauna is poorly studied, whereas mammals and birds are well studied. Approximately 1,100 of rare and endangered plant and animal species are included in the Red Book of the Russian Federation. The ecosystems of tundra, taiga, steppe and old-growth forests are deteriorating due to various threats.

• Steppe ecosystems are rich in plant diversity (900-1,000 vascular species/km2), while the arid steppe is richer in animal diversity.
• However, steppe and broad-leaved forests are the most threatened biomes and have almost disappeared.
• About a quarter of Russian territory is occupied by mountains that feature a great variety of natural conditions.

In terms of economic benefits, biodiversity and ecosystem services have an estimated average value of $US 5-6 trillion. Pressures on ecosystems continue to reduce the real benefits derived from biodiversity at a rate of 2-5% annually.

How much military does Russia have left?

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
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Emblem of the Russian Armed Forces
Banner of the Russian Armed Forces
Founded	1721 ( Imperial Russian Army )
Current form	7 May 1992
Service branches	Ground Forces Navy Aerospace Forces Strategic Rocket Forces Airborne Forces
Headquarters	Ministry of Defence, Moscow
Leadership
Supreme Commander-in-Chief	Vladimir Putin
Minister of Defence	Sergei Shoigu
Chief of the General Staff	Valery Gerasimov
Personnel
Military age	18
Conscription	12 months
Active personnel	c.  1,150,000 ( ranked 5th )
Reserve personnel	c.  2,000,000
Expenditures
Budget	US$86.4 billion (2023) ( ranked 3rd )
Percent of GDP	4.1% (2023)
Industry
Domestic suppliers	See list:
Foreign suppliers	Belarus ( MZKT ) Italy ( Iveco ) Iran ( HESA )
Annual imports	US$905 million (2010–2021)
Annual exports	US$74.535 billion (2010–2021)
Related articles
History	Military history of the Russian Federation
Ranks	Army ranks Navy ranks Aerospace Forces ranks

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ( Russian : ё ́ ́ ́, Vooružjonnyje Síly Rossíjskoj Federácii ), commonly referred to as the Russian Armed Forces, are the military of Russia, In terms of active-duty personnel, they are the world’s fifth-largest military force, with 1.15 million and at least two million reserve personnel,

Russia plans to expand its active personnel force to 1.5 million by 2026, which will make it the third largest in the world, after China and India. The CIA lists branches of service as the Ground Forces, the Navy, and the Aerospace Forces, as well as two independent arms of service: the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Airborne Forces,

In addition, the Special Operations Forces Command was established in 2013, with an estimated strength in 2022 of 1,000, possibly with additional supporting staff. In 2023, Russia had the world’s third-highest military expenditure, allocating a budget of approximately US$86.4 billion to the military.

The Russian Armed Forces maintain the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, and possess the world’s second-largest fleet of ballistic missile submarines ; they are also one of only three national militaries (alongside those of the United States and China ) that operate strategic bombers, With certain exceptions, Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27,

In spite of Russia’s perceived military strength, as recorded in various assessments, deficiencies have been noted in the country’s combat performance on both the tactical and operational scales. According to multiple reports, endemic corruption within the Russian Armed Forces has had a major impact on Russia’s ability to effectively project hard power,

1. Amidst the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, severe logistical failures have greatly impacted the operational performance of Russian troops, as different service branches have struggled to coordinate and work together.
2. Continuous shortcomings have led Russia’s war effort to suffer extensive setbacks since the initial invasion; the Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses of occupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate.

Researchers from the RAND Corporation have observed that Russia continues to struggle with military professionalization. Directly controlled by the Security Council of Russia, the Russian Armed Forces form part of the country’s defence services under Russian law, fulfilling this capacity alongside the Border Guard of the Federal Security Service, the National Guard, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Protective Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations,

How many Russian girls are single?

Russia’s Single Ladies Fed Up With Country’s Useless Bachelors Anna Shpakova is a beautiful Russian blonde. A professional dancer and the art director of Moscow’s new Leica Academy, she favors a wardrobe of black designer threads that hang gracefully on her trim frame.

She is a fixture of Russia’s avant-garde art circles, and can often be found hosting hip gallery openings, welcoming visitors to photography exhibits at the Russian Academy of Arts, or teaching art students at the Rodchenko Photo School. She lives in a cozy, artwork-filled abode on the pedestrian Old Arbat street, famous for housing the most expensive boutiques in town.

She is independent and ambitious—at 17, she left home from a provincial city in Belarus to study psychology at Moscow State University. Now in her mid-30s, her life seems to be perfect. And yet, like so many Russian women, Shpakova has lost hope of finding a suitable mate among her fellow countrymen. (She has “not met a single gentleman among Russian men,” she says.) The litany of complaints that Russian ladies have against their male counterparts is long: They smoke too much and drink too much.

They cheat shamelessly and curse freely. They expect their girlfriends and wives to clean for them, cook for them, and to look like models. More seriously, they are often violent and feel threatened by independent, high-earning women. The dating prospects are so grim, in fact, that Shpakova and many other Russian women of her generation are consciously deciding to stay single.

Moscow alone boasts more than 3 million single women between the ages of 25 and 50, out of a population of 11.1 million (that’s three times the number of single Muscovite men). In Russia as a whole, there are 11 million more women than men, due in part to a century of bloody revolutions, gulags, and wars that drained the country’s male population.

Add to that the fact that male life expectancy is particularly grim in Russia—on average, 59 years, as opposed to a woman’s 73 years, the largest gap of any country in the world—and you’ve got a serious demographic imbalance. Still, the numbers of single men and women in Russia are roughly equal: 17.6 million single ladies to 17.2 million single lads.

“That means that Russian women simply have no interest in marrying Russian men,” says Irina Zhuravleva, the head of Russia’s census department at the Federal Statistics Service. A single woman herself, Zhuravleva says she “never had any interest in marrying a drunk, to later suffer the pain of divorce and splitting real estate.” Her stance reflects the fact that Russian culture has yet to catch up with women’s lib—a point that frustrates the country’s younger women in particular.

• Despite the overwhelming surplus of women in Russia, only 3 percent of the country’s senior executives are female and a scant 6 percent of politicians are women.
• While Russian women have long been celebrated for their strength—they “would hold up a galloping horse,” wrote the poet Nikolay Nekrasov in praise—they are still expected to be subservient to men in the workplace, where business is often conducted afterhours in the male-only steam baths.

Just recently, Russian women have begun to circumvent this traditional system by forming female networking events. At StartUp Women, a recent conference held in Moscow, hundreds of glamorous female entrepreneurs discussed how to take over consumer markets through online social networks.

• Most of these women admitted to being disillusioned by the way their career paths were blocked by male colleagues.
• In another part of the city, a group called Straight ‘A’ Students—a movement of politically active, mostly divorced mothers—brainstormed what a Russian brand of feminism might look like.

“I spoke to Putin about our female movement,” founder Olga Kryshtanovskaya said. “He disliked the idea.” Russia’s male leadership was publicly accused of chauvinism last week by Valentina Matviyenko, Russia’s most senior female politician, who predicted a woman would sit in the presidential chair in as little as 15 years.

1. Be prepared for matriarchy,” she declared.
2. It is approaching.” One young woman who hopes she might make it up the political ladder is Alyona Popova, a petite 29-year-old with a distinctive blonde braid, who describes herself as “unstoppable.” The single Yekaterinburg native, who is independently wealthy, has already founded two midsize IT companies in Moscow and adopted four foster children.

Last fall, she ran for Parliament on an opposition ticket. When she lost, she then joined the opposition rallies in Moscow. During one protest, Popova says, police broke her arm. Despite her commitment to the cause, Popova says that many male protesters told her to sit at home and make borscht instead of turning out to organize rallies.

1. It’s an attitude—expressed in the traditional Russian adage that “an accomplished woman is a married woman”—that exasperates Popova.
2. I am sick of men always treating me as if I were somebody’s dumb secretary, unable to make my own decisions!” Popova exclaimed emotionally during a coffee break at the Russian Socialist Left Alliance last week.

“I am not concerned about staying a single woman,” she declared, and said she is planning to “raise hell from the bottom up” in Russian politics—particularly in the provinces, where she said she has found grassroots help from local women who are eager to monitor the court systems and potential corruption.

While Popova is a single woman working to change the system from within, other young women remain distrustful of Russia’s political and legal systems, which are run by and for men. “It is unsafe to grow to close with them,” says Shpakova, the art director, who describes her run-ins with her male colleagues as a “constant battle with light sabers.” Shpakova saw the full misogyny of Russia’s legal system close up when she tried to stop her last Russian ex-boyfriend from sending her threatening, abusive texts after they broke up.

When Shpakova consulted a lawyer, she was told that “there is no law defending a person’s dignity, no state guarantee of personal security,” she said. Despite the of domestic violence in Russia, the country has no law on the books outlawing physical abuse of a spouse.

1. It’s unsurprising, then, that Russia is home to the world’s second-highest divorce rate—after Belarus—with 65 percent of marriages ending in a split.
2. And while many Russian women still hold out hopes of finding a Prince Charming, they are also coming to terms with the weight of the demographic and cultural factors working against them.

Some women, like Shpakova, have decided to date only non-Russian men. Others have resigned themselves to a life of singledom, rather than wrestle their boyfriends into the role of a modern, supportive partner. “Most have no clue how to communicate,” says 40-year-old Maria Shubina, a leading researcher at the Boris Yeltsin Foundation in Moscow.

• Their parents had no tradition of sitting down and talking things over, either.” After watching several relationships with Russian boyfriends fall apart, Shubina realized that she needed to redefine her idea of happily ever after.
• As a teen, I always thought I would be married by my early 20s” she says.

“With age 40 approaching, I am ready to give up looking for the love of my life.” : Russia’s Single Ladies Fed Up With Country’s Useless Bachelors

How to date a Russian girl?

4. Plan thoughtful dates – Russian women will go wild for sincere displays of affection and imaginative date ideas. Make a lasting impression by arranging a romantic picnic amongst nature or an unforgettable dinner with a candlelit ambiance – going the extra mile on your dates could make all the difference!

Why does Russia have low birthrate?

One of the key sociopolitical problems of Russian society is that seventy-year-old political leaders are deciding for young people how they will live and what they will die for. At the end of last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the government to draw up a package of measures by 2023 that will increase birth rates and life expectancy in Russia.

He also expressed bewilderment at the falling birth rates in a number of regions. Yet just a few days later, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed changing the age at which Russian men are conscripted for mandatory military service from eighteen to twenty-one and increasing the upper age limit for conscription from twenty-seven to thirty.

That would mean young men being called up after earning their college degrees, and trained specialists being pulled out of the job market to have their skills voided by military service. There is a major discrepancy between these two objectives. If men go to war or emigrate en masse instead of fathering children, where will the children come from? The effect on the labor market will also be severe: conscription at such a productive age leeches the labor force out of an economy that is already expected to lose 3–4 million people aged twenty to forty by 2030 (compared to 2020) for objective demographic reasons.

The working population is also losing those who have already left or will leave the country in response to the intense militarization of life, not to mention those who are mobilized, killed, or maimed in combat if the so-called “special operation” continues. Combined, this will create a significant labor force deficit and a plethora of demographic problems, further exacerbating the negative dynamics in birth rates observed in Russia since 2016–2017.

The decrease in the working age population will become chronic, and the “preservation of the people” that Putin has spoken about for many years will not be achieved. Some of the objective reasons for Russia’s demographic problems reflect historical dynamics: the number of women of childbearing age is falling, and the average age at which women are having children is rising steadily in modernized, urban, well-educated populations.

• There are short- and medium-term factors, too (which can also have long-term consequences).
• The COVID-19 pandemic and the “special military operation” have created a backdrop of extreme uncertainty about the future.
• This has predictably changed family planning: some people are deciding not to have children or to postpone starting a family or having another child until more psychologically and financially stable times.

Nor does the militarization of life in Russia encourage people to add to their families, except for those who consider it their duty to supply the motherland with cannon fodder for future wars. A year of military service for the 300,000 men mobilized into the army in September and October 2022 will mean 25,000 fewer births, estimates Mikhail Denisenko, director of the Institute of Demography of the Higher School of Economics.

• That isn’t a huge number, but it could rise significantly as a result of emigration, the long-term decline in birth rates, and potential expansion of the mobilization age.
• Russian legislators are also pitching in to increase the birth rate.
• Worried about the reduced production of future soldiers for their imaginary empire, lawmakers—supported by the clergy—are mulling a partial ban on abortion.

Yet Russia has mostly completed the “third demographic transition,” when the majority of the population gains the ability to regulate birth rates. Abortions are no longer widespread in the country. We are seeing a phenomenon Russia has faced many times: wave after wave of wars and repression that drain away human resources.

• The best way to promote higher birth rates is to create the conditions for a stable, predictable, peaceful, and safe life—including for young men, safe from the clutches of the military.
• Until 2022, Russia was considered a market economy with mid-level incomes, though those incomes were not distributed evenly, which fueled a trend that worries education economics experts: young people whose families cannot afford to put them through college have started rejecting higher education in favor of secondary vocational training, which allows them to enter the labor market sooner.

The proposal to change the conscription age to twenty-one, which was likely approved by the Kremlin, will be a double whammy for the labor market and the economy: highly qualified college graduates will not be able to enter the labor market and will instead end up in the military and lose their qualifications, while young men with vocational degrees who are already in the labor market will be torn from the economy partway toward improving their skills.

It would be a mistake to think that this wouldn’t affect the qualitative and quantitative indicators of Russian GDP, household income, and quality of human capital. Essentially, there is a second war under way at home: a war against the quality of human capital. And the militarization of the country creates all of the conditions to reduce this quality for the longest of terms.

Although Russia will not see large-scale unemployment, this is only the case because the economy will face a deficit of both high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Putin has encouraged the armed forces not to be shy about requesting more financing, and this also impacts the quality of human capital.

Spending on the military and security is “unproductive expenditure,” meaning that it does not improve quality of life. It is anti-human in all senses. Meanwhile, the proportion of productive expenditure (above all, education and healthcare) is stagnant at best and cannot compete with the unproductive expenditure that takes priority for a military-police state.

Furthermore, it’s difficult to assess the real scale of spending on the military and defense (including the state’s defense from its own citizens): about 23 percent of expenditure in the 2023 budget is classified. Another trend, according to Tatyana Klyachko, director of the Center for Continuing Education Economics of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, is that the average number of years of education of the employed population in Russia is stagnating at best, and falling in some aspects.

This also reflects the fact that young people want to quickly enter the labor market and start making money. The value of a good education is declining. For the state today, quickly assembling and disassembling a Kalashnikov rifle is a more important skill. Authoritarian regimes want to get rid of high-quality and globally competitive education.

The “special military operation” has only accelerated the political purges at Russian educational establishments. We have yet to find out how many young people with science and technology degrees have left Russia (including due to fears of being persecuted for espionage or treason if working with covert innovations).

1. However, even the nearsighted state has noticed that the number of high school students planning to take the Unified State Exam in physics and information sciences has fallen.
2. A high-quality, modern education produces modern, thinking people, and thinking people aren’t prepared to go and fight for false ideals.

Educated individuals are independent individuals, including economically. A militarized state does not need independent people. It needs people who diligently obey orders. One of the main problems of Russian society today is that the generation of seventy-year-old Russian leaders is deciding for young people how they will live and what they will die for.

Which country has the highest girl to guy ratio?

Society Demographics

Premium Premium statistics Industry-specific and extensively researched technical data (partially from exclusive partnerships). A paid subscription is required for full access. Worldwide, the male population is slightly higher than the female population, although this varies by country.

Which country has more females?

List of countries male and female population Out of 201 countries/regions estimated by United Nations, females outnumber males in 125 countries/regions. In absolute terms, Russian Federation has 10.6 mn more females than males, followed by Brazil (3.79 mn), the United States of America (3.46 mn), and Ukraine (3.18 mn).

• There are 14 countries where the female population is more than the male population by over one mn.
• On the other hand, males outnumber females in 76 countries/territories.
• India has 54.54 mn more males, followed by China, having 36.83 cr more males than females.
• In 12 countries, the male population exceeds the female population by over one mn.

The United Arab Emirates is the highest gainer in male ranking as its rank is up by 38 from 113th in female to 75th in male ranking. Oman (+25), Qatar (+22), Kuwait(+14), Saudi Arabia (+13), Maldives (+12), and Bahrain (+10) are other noticeable gainers.

Which country has the highest female population?

China is the top country by female population in the world. As of 2022, female population in China was 691 million persons that accounts for 17.55% of the world’s female population. The top 5 countries (others are India, the United States of America, Indonesia, and Pakistan) account for 45.68% of it.

Is Russia’s population small?

Russia 2023 population is estimated at 144,444,359 people at mid year. Russia population is equivalent to 1.8% of the total world population.

Can you identify reasons why much of Russia is sparsely populated?

3

Identify the key geographic features of Russia Analyze how the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union approached the issue of ethnic identity Describe the current areas of ethnic conflict within Russia Explain how Russian history impacted its modern-day geographic landscape

Russia is the largest country in the world, containing 1/8 of the entire world’s land area (see Figure 3.1 ). Russia is also the northernmost large and populous country in the world, with much of the country lying above the Arctic Circle. Its population, however, is comparatively small with around 143 million people, the majority of whom live south of the 60 degree latitude line and in the western portions of Russia near Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Figure 3.1: Map of Russia (CIA World Factbook, Public Domain) Because of its large size, Russia has a wide variety of natural features and resources. The country is located on the northeastern portion of the Eurasian landmass. It is bordered to the north by the Arctic Ocean, to the east by the Pacific Ocean, and to the south, by the Black and Caspian Seas.

The Ural Mountains, running north to south, traditionally form the boundary between Europe and Asia and presented a formidable historical barrier to development. Culturally and physiographically, Western Russia, beyond the Ural Mountains, is quite similar to that of Eastern Europe. The region of Russia east of the Ural Mountains is known as Siberia.

In addition to the Ural Mountains, Russia contains several other areas of high relief (see Figure 3.2 ). Most notably, the Caucasus Mountains, forming the border between Russia and Southwest Asia, and the volcanic highlands of Russia’s far east Kamchatka Peninsula. Figure 3.2: Topographical Map of Russia (© Tobias1984, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0) Russia’s Volga River, running through central Russia into the Caspian Sea, is the longest river on the European continent and drains most of western Russia. The river is also an important source of irrigation and hydroelectric power.

Lake Baikal, located in southern Siberia, is the world’s deepest lake and also the world’s largest freshwater lake. It contains around one-fifth of the entire world’s unfrozen surface water. Like the deep lakes of Africa’s rift valley, Lake Baikal was formed from a divergent tectonic plate boundary. Although Russia’s land area is quite large, much of the region is too cold for agriculture.

As shown in Figure 3.3, the northernmost portion of Russia is dominated by, a biome characterized by very cold temperatures and limited tree growth. Here, temperatures can drop below -50°C (-58°F) and much of the soil is, soil that is consistently below the freezing point of water (0°C or 32°F). Figure 3.3: Biomes of Russia (Derivative work from original by Sten Porse, Wikimedia Commons) Although looking at a map, you might assume that Russia has extensive port facilities owing to its vast eastern coastline, it actually has relatively few ice-free ports. Figure 3.4: Port of Vladivostok, Russia (© Dr. Leonid Kozlov, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0) Russia’s climate more broadly is affected by a number of key factors. In terms of its latitudinal position, meaning its position relative to the equator, Russia is located very far north.

In general, as you increase in latitude away from the equator, the climate gets colder. The strong east-west alignment of Russia’s major biomes reflects this latitudinal influence. Russia’s climate is also affected by its continental position. In general, areas that exhibit a are located near the center of a continent away from water bodies and experience more extremes in temperature due to drier air.

Water helps regulate air temperature and can absorb temperature changes better than land. In the winter, areas away from water can be very cold, while in the summer, temperatures are quite hot and there is little precipitation. The third key driver of climate in Russia is its altitudinal position.

As you increase in elevation, temperatures decrease. You might have experienced this when hiking in mountains or flying on an aircraft and feeling the cold window. Russia’s Ural Mountains, for example, are clearly visible on a map of its biomes as the alpine tundra region owing to its high altitude. Russia’s size and varied physiographic regions have presented some challenges for its population.

Much of Russia is simply too cold for widespread human settlement. Thus, even though Russia is the largest country, the area that is suitable for agriculture and intensive development is much smaller. In Russia’s northern regions, agricultural development is restricted by short growing seasons and frequent droughts.

1. As snow melts, it takes topsoil with it, and thus erosion is a serious issue in these areas as well.
2. Still, some have carved out settlements in this frigid environment.
3. Oymyakon, located in northeastern Russia, is considered to be the coldest permanently inhabited places in the world (see Figure 3.5 ).

It has a population of around 500 and temperatures here once dropped to -71.2°C (-96°F)! It takes 20 hours to reach Oymyakon from the nearest city of Yakutsk. Figure 3.5: Map of Oymyakon, Russia (Derivative work from original by Marmelad, Wikimedia Commons) Industry, too, is hampered by Russia’s cold climate in the Siberian region. Although Siberia accounts for over three-quarters of Russia’s land area, it contains only one-quarter of its population.

In a region so sparsely populated, how do you build roads, factories, and large settlements? Even if there are resources present, as there are, how do you get them to nearby industrial areas? The industrial developments and human settlements that do exist in this region require high energy consumption and highly specialized facilities needed to cope with cold temperatures and permanently frozen soil.

However, global changes in climate have had some dramatic effects on Russian geography. Areas that were previously permafrost have begun to thaw, leading to erosion and mud, which both present challenges for development. In Siberia, giant holes in the ground began to appear around 2014 and initially baffled scientists.

• These massive holes were later found to be pockets of methane gas trapped in previously frozen soil that had thawed due to the warming climate.
• If global temperatures continue to climb, the area of permafrost will shrink, increasing the potential for agriculture in northern Russia.
• New oil and gas reserves that were previously trapped under frozen soil could likewise become available.

Previous shipping routes along Russia’s eastern and northern coasts that were covered in ice could become passable. While warming temperatures might seem beneficial for Russia’s frigid northern region, they are accompanied by more troublesome long-term concerns.

It is estimated that a huge amount of carbon, around 1600 gigatons (or 1.6 trillion tons), is stored in the world’s permafrost. The methane and carbon released from these permafrost stores could exacerbate global warming. Changing temperatures have also been associated with the increased risk of wildfires.

In Russia, peatlands, areas of partially decayed vegetation, are particularly at risk. There has been an increase in droughts and flooding throughout Russia and many scientists believe that Russia’s close proximity to the Arctic Circle makes it even more vulnerable to changes in temperature.

• Climate factors have also shaped the distribution of Russia’s population.
• Most of Russia’s population lives west of the Ural Mountains where the climate is more temperate and there are more connections with Eastern Europe (see Figure 3.6 ).
• Russia is highly urbanized, with almost three-quarters of the population living in cities.

Its largest city and capital, Moscow, is home to around 12 million people. Figure 3.6: Population Density in Russia, 2012 (Derivative work from original by Kartoshka1994, Wikimedia Commons) Russia’s population has experienced some interesting changes over the past few decades. Its population peaked at over 148 million in the early 1990s before experiencing a rapid decline.

1. When geographers explore a country’s population, they don’t just ask “Where is it changing?” but also ” Why is it changing?” For Russia, the economic declines coinciding with the dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to low birth rates.
2. Generally, when a country experiences economic decline or uncertainty, people tend to delay having children.

Today, due to higher birth rates and a government push to encourage immigration, Russia’s population growth has stabilized and could grow from 143.5 million in 2013 to 146 million by 2050. Russia’s death rate remains quite high, however, at 13.1 per 1000 people compared to the European Union average of 9.7 per 1000.

Alcoholism rates are high, particularly among men in Russia, and cardiovascular disease accounts for over half of all deaths. In addition, although Russia is highly urbanized, more people are now moving from Russia’s crowded cities to more sparsely populated rural areas, in contrast to the more common rural to urban migration seen elsewhere in the world.

Russia’s current geographic landscape has been shaped by physical features, such as climate and topography, as well as historical events. Why is the capital of Russia Moscow, and why is its population so clustered in the west? In the 13th century, Moscow was actually an important principality, or city-state ruled by a monarch.

1. The Grand Duchy of Moscow, or Muscovy as it was known in English, became a powerful state, defeating and surrounding its neighbors and claiming control over a large portion of Rus’ territory, an ancient region occupied by a number of East Slavic tribes.
2. The represent the largest Indo-European ethno-linguistic group in Europe and include Poles, Ukrainians, Serbs, as well as Russians.

From the mid-1400s onward, the Muscovite territory expanded at an impressive rate (see Figure 3.7 ). In 1300 CE, the territory occupied an area of around 20,000 square kilometers; by 1462 CE, that number increased to 430,000 square kilometers. By 1584 CE, the territory had swelled to 5.4 million square kilometers. Figure 3.7: Growth of Russia, 1300-1900 (Map by Stephan Steinbach, www.alternativetransport.wordpress.com, CC BY-SA) During this time, Russia’s government shifted as well. In 1547 CE, Grand Duke Ivan IV, better known as “Ivan the Terrible,” crowned himself the first Tsar.

1. The term tsar, also spelled czar, stems from the Roman title “Caesar” and was used to designate a ruler, much like the term “king” or “emperor.” Ivan IV nearly doubled the territory of Russia during his reign, conquering numerous surrounding ethnic groups and tribes.
2. Russia’s status as an “empire” dates back to the 1700s under the rule of Peter the Great.

Peter was able to conquer Russia’s northwestern regions, establishing eastern seaports and founding the of Saint Petersburg along the Baltic Sea. A forward capital is a capital that has been intentionally relocated, generally because of economic or strategic reasons, and is often positioned on the edge of contested territory.

• Overall, the reforms of Peter the Great transformed the country and made it more similar to Western Europe.
• The conclusion of World War I coincided with the end of the Russian Empire.
• The Russian Army fared poorly in the war, with approximately 1.7 million casualties.
• Russia’s people felt that the ruling class had become detached from the problems of everyday people and there were widespread rumors of corruption.

Russia went through a rapid period of industrialization, which left many traditional farmers out of work. As people moved to the cities, there was inadequate housing and insufficient jobs. The economic and human cost of World War I, coupled with the plight of workers who felt exploited during the Industrial Revolution, ultimately led to the overthrow of Nicholas II who, along with his family, was imprisoned and later executed.

Eventually, the, a Marxist political party led by Vladimir Lenin, overthrew the interim government and created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, abbreviated as the USSR and sometimes simply called the Soviet Union. The capital was also moved back to Moscow from Saint Petersburg. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Joseph Stalin took control and instituted both a socialist economy and collective agriculture.

Ideally, the changes the Bolsheviks supported were intended to address the failures of Nicholas II providing more stable wages and food supplies. Rather than have individual peasant farms that had limited interconnections and poor systems of distribution, the state would collectivize farming with several farming families collectively owning the land.

Under a, the production, prices of goods, and wages received by workers is set by the government. In the Soviet Union, the government took control of all industries and invested heavily in the production of capital goods, those that are used to produce other goods, such as machinery and tools. Though this system was intended to address concerns and inequalities that had developed under the tsars, the Soviet government under Stalin was fraught with its own economic and social problems.

During the period of Russia’s expansion and development as an empire, and later during the time of the Soviet Union, Russia’s territory included not only ethnic Russians but other surrounding groups as well. is a key feature of cultural identity and refers to the identification of a group of people with a common language, ancestry, or cultural history.

Many of these minority ethnic groups harbored resentment over being controlled by an imperial power. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Empire’s response to the non-Russian communities they controlled was known as, where non-Russian groups give up their ethnic and linguistic identity and adopt the Russian culture and language.

This type of policy is known as cultural, where one cultural group adopts the language and customs of another group. The Russian language was taught in schools and minority languages were banned in public places. Catholic schools were banned and instead, Russian Orthodoxy, part of the, was taught at state-run schools.

1. The Russian Empire essentially sought to make everyone in the territory Russian.
2. This policy was only marginally successful, however, and was especially difficult to implement in the outer regions.
3. Under the Soviet Union, the policy of cultural assimilation had less to do with becoming Russian and more to do with being part of the Soviet Union, what could be thought of as Sovietization.

The Soviet government organized the country as a federation, where territories within the country had varying degrees of autonomy (see Figure 3.8 ). The larger ethnic groups formed the Soviet Socialist Republics, or SSRs. The Uzbek SSR, for example, largely contained members of the Uzbek ethnic group.

The Kazakh SSR similarly consisted mostly of people who were ethnically Kazakh. These SSRs did not represent all of the ethnic diversity present in Russia nor did they provide these territories with autonomy. You might recognize the names of these republics as they gradually became independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Turkmen SSR became Turkmenistan, for example. Many of these areas, particularly in Central Asia, are majority Muslim and thus adopted the Persian suffix “-stan” meaning “place of” or “country” after independence. Figure 3.8: Map of the USSR (Courtesy of Perry-Castañeda Library of the University of Texas at Austin, Public Domain) Under Soviet Rule, some policies of Russification expanded. In Muslim areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the use of the Arabic alphabet, the language of the Qur’an, was abolished.

The government also sent many Russians into majority non-Russian areas to further unify the country. Other ethnic groups, particularly those perceived as troublemakers by the government, were deported from their ancestral homelands and resettled elsewhere. The ethnic map of the former Soviet Union today, in part, reflects this multicultural history and the legacy of resettlement policies (see Figure 3.9 ).

Over 3 million people were deported to Siberia between 1941 and 1949, a large portion of whom died from disease or malnutrition. Others were deported from the Baltic area or from the area near the Black Sea. Overall, around 6 million people were internally displaced as a result of the Soviet Union’s resettlement policies and between 1 and 1.5 million of them died as a result.

Figure 3.9: Ethnic Groups in the Former USSR (Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division, Public Domain) Although Russia today is comprised mostly of people who speak Russian and identify with the Russian ethnicity, it contains 185 different ethnic groups speaking over 100 different languages. The largest minority groups in Russia are the Tatars, representing around 4 percent of the population with over 5 million people, and Ukrainians at around 1.4 percent or almost 2 million people.

Other ethnic groups, like the Votes near Saint Petersburg, have only a few dozen members remaining. Because of the Soviet resettlement policies, the former Soviet republics have sizable Russian minorities. Kazakhstan and Latvia, for example, are almost one-quarter Russian.

This has often led to tension within Russia as minority groups have sought independence and outside of Russia as ethnic groups have clashed over leadership. In Ukraine in particular, tension between the Ukrainian population and Russian minority has remained high and represents a broader tension between the Eastern European regions that are more closely aligned with Russia and those that seek greater connectivity and trade with Western Europe.

Eastern Ukraine is largely comprised of Russian speakers, whileWestern Ukraine predominantly speaks the state language of Ukrainian (see Figure 3.10 ). Overall, around three-quarters of people in Ukraine identify with the Ukrainian ethnicity. Figure 3.10: Map of the usage of the Russian language in Ukraine, 2003 (© User:Russianname, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.5) In 2014, the tension between the two groups escalated as then-president Victor Yanukovych backed away from a deal to increase connections with the European Union and instead sought closer ties with Russia.

• In Western Ukraine, people engaged in widespread protests prompting the government to sign a set of anti-protest laws, while in Eastern Ukraine, most supported the government.
• Ultimately, Yanukovych was removed from office prompting military intervention from Russia.
• Specifically, Russia sought control of Crimea, an area that had been annexed by the Russian Empire and was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic until the 1950s when it was transferred to Ukraine.

After the 2014 protests, a majority of the people of Crimea supported joining Russia and it was formally annexed by Russian forces. The region is now controlled by Russia (see Figure 3.11 ). The international community, however, has largely not recognized Crimea’s sovereignty or Russia’s annexation.

1. This conflict again escalated in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, leading to the largest European refugee crisis since World War II.
2. Figure 3.11: Map of Crimea (Derivative work from original by Crosswords, WikimediaCommons) Several other ethnic groups that remain in Russia desire independence, particularly in the outskirts of the country in the Caucasus region along Russia’s border with Georgia and Armenia (see Figure 3.12 ).

Chechnya is largely comprised of Chechens, a distinct Sunni Muslim nation. The territory opposed Russian conquest of the region in the 19th century but was forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union in the early 20th century.400,000 Chechens were deported by Stalin in the 1940s and more than 100,000 died.

• Although Chechnya sought independence from Russia, sometimes through violent opposition, it has remained under Russian control following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
• Dagestan has been the site of several Islamic insurgencies seeking separation from Russia.
• Ossetia remains divided between a northern portion controlled by Russia and a southern region controlled by Georgia.

Figure 3.12: Map of the Caucasus Region (© Jeroenscommons, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.5) In an area as large and as ethnically diverse as Russia, controlling the territory in a way that is acceptable to all of its residents has proven difficult. In many large countries, the farther away you get from the capital area and large cities, the more cultural differences you find.

1. Some governments have embraced this cultural difference, creating autonomous regions that function largely independently though remain part of the larger state.
2. Stalin and Russia’s tsars before him tried to unify the country through the suppression of ethnic difference, but ethnic and linguistic identities are difficult to obliterate.

The Soviet Government, led by Lenin and later by Stalin, advocated a communist system. In a capitalist system, market forces dictate prices according to supply and demand. Those who control the means of production, known as the bourgeoisie in the Marxist philosophy, are much wealthier than the workers, known as the proletariat.

In a communist system, however, the means of production are communally owned, and the intended result is that there are no classes of rich and poor and no groups of landowners and landless workers. In reality, no government practices pure capitalism or pure communism, but rather, governments are situated along a continuum (see Figure 3.13 ).

Anarchy, the absence of government control, exists only in temporary situations, such as when a previous government is overthrown and political groups are vying for power. In most Western countries, a mix of capitalism and socialism, where economic and social systems are communally owned, is practiced to varying degrees.

Denmark, for example, which has been consistently ranked as one of the happiest countries in the world, has a market economy with few business regulations but government funded universal healthcare, unemployment compensation, and maternity leave, and most higher education is free. The United States is largely capitalist, but the government provides retirement benefits through the social security system, funds the military, and supports the building and maintenance of the interstate highway system.

Although China’s government is communist, it has also embraced elements of the market economy and allows some private enterprise as well as foreign trade and investment. All governments must address three basic questions of economics: what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce.

1. The answers to these questions vary depending on the state and the situation.
2. Figure 3.13: Continuum of Government Control (Figure by author) In the Soviet system, the government dictated economic policy, rather than relying on free market mechanisms and the law of supply and demand.
3. This required the government to intervene at all levels of the economy.

The prices of goods needed to be set by the central government, the production levels of goods needed to be determined, the coordination of manufacturers and distributors was needed – everything that is traditionally accomplished through private individuals and companies in a capitalist model was the responsibility of the Soviet government.

• To coordinate such a wide array of goods and services, long-term planning was needed.
• The Soviet government instituted a series of five-year plans which established long-term goals and emphasized quotas for the production of goods.
• This system lacked flexibility, however, and was often inefficient in its production and distribution of goods.

The Soviet government had two principle objectives: first, to accelerate industrialization, and secondly, to collectivize agriculture. The collectivization of agriculture, though intended to increase crop yields and make distribution of food more efficient, was ultimately a failure.

By the early 1930s, 90 percent of agricultural land in the Soviet Union had become collectivized, meaning owned by a collection of people rather than individuals. Every element of the production of agriculture, from the tractors to the livestock, was collectivized rather than individually owned. A family could not even have its own vegetable garden.

Ideally, under such a system, all farmers would work equally and would share the benefits equally. Unfortunately, the earnings of collective farmers was typically less than private farmers. This led to a reduction in agricultural output as well as a reduction in the number of livestock.

1. Coupled with a poor harvest in the early 1930s, the country experienced widespread famine and food insecurity.
2. It is estimated that 12 million people died as a result of the collectivization of agriculture.
3. Soviet industrial development, too, was plagued with inefficiencies.
4. In a typical market economy, particular places specialize in the production of certain goods and the system works out the most efficient method of production and distribution.

A furniture maker might locate near a supply of hardwood, for example, to minimize transportation costs. A large factory might locate near a hydroelectric plant to ensure an inexpensive power source. Certain places, due to luck or physical geography, have more resources than others and this can lead to regional imbalances.

The Soviet government, however, wanted everything and everyone to be equal. If one region had all of the industrial development, then the people in that region would be disproportionately wealthy and the region would be more vulnerable to attack by an outside force. The government also hoped that the dispersal of industry would force the country to be interconnected.

If one area had a steel plant and another had a factory that used steel to produce machines, the two would have to rely on one another and neither would have an advantage. Thus, they aimed to disperse industrial development across the country. If you were a geographer tasked with finding the best location for a new industry, you’d likely take into account underlying resources, such as the raw materials needed for manufacturing and the energy needed to power the factory.

You might think about labor supplies and try to locate the industry near a large labor pool. You might also think about how to get the good to consumers efficiently, and locate near a shipping port or rail line. Rather than take these geographic factors into account, however, the Soviet government sought to disperse industry as much as possible.

Industries were located with little regard for the location of labor or raw materials. This meant that inefficiencies were built into the system, and unnecessary transportation costs mounted. The substantial costs of supporting an inefficient system of industrial development were magnified by the costs needed to fund the,

The Cold War occurred following World War II and was a time of political and military tension primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union. Western Europe, which was largely capitalist, was divided from the communist Soviet Union by the so-called, a dividing line between the Soviet Union and its satellite states who aligned with the Warsaw Pact, a collective defense treaty, and Western European countries allied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see Figure 3.14 ).

The Cold War was so named because it was different from a traditional “hot” war in that it did not involve direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. It did, however, result in armed conflicts in other parts of the world as well as a massive stockpile of military weaponry.

1. Figure 3.14: Map of Military Alliances During the Cold War (Derivative work from original by Sémhur, Wikimedia Commons) During the 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev supported restructuring the Soviet economy with a series of some market-like reforms, known as Perestroika.
2. He also supported glasnost, an increase in government transparency and openness.

Unfortunately, these reforms could not change the system quickly enough and loosened government controls only worsened the condition and inefficiencies of the Soviet economy. The Soviet government, already stretched thin financially from a system of development that largely ignored geography, could not support the unprofitable state-supported enterprises and mounting military expenses.

• Ultimately, the country went bankrupt.
• In a system where every aspect of the economy is linked, it only takes one link to break the chain and far-from Gorbachev’s policies strengthening the chain, Perestroika only weakened it further.
• The Soviet Union formally dissolved in 1991.
• Some have argued that the Soviet Union collapsed economically.

Others maintain that it was primarily a political collapse, led by an ineffective government and increasing territorial resistance. Geography largely played a role as well, with the government ignoring fundamental principles of spatial location and interaction.

1. The collapse of the Soviet Union had far-reaching effects on the Russian landscape and even today, Russia is affected by the legacy of the Soviet Union.
2. The remnants of Soviet bureaucracy, for example, affect everything from the cost of road building to the forms needed to get clothes dry cleaned.
3. After the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union, the government transitioned to a market economy.

In many cases, those who had positions of power within the Soviet government gained control over previously state-owned industries creating a wealthy class often called a Russian oligarchy. Despite some setbacks and global economic downturns, Russia’s economy has improved significantly since the end of the Soviet Union and Russia now has the sixth-largest economy in the world.

1. Poverty and unemployment rates have also fallen sharply in recent decades.
2. Although Russia’s population fell sharply following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it has rebounded somewhat in recent years.
3. Abandoned industrial towns and work settlements built by the Soviet Union dot the landscape, evidence of the Soviet government’s ill-fated attempt to decentralize its population and development (see Figure 3.15 ).

The, completed in 1916 to connect Moscow with Russia’s eastern reaches in Vladivostok, continues to be the most important transportation link in Russia, but Russia’s highway system remains largely centralized in the west. In the east, the decentralization of settlements and difficult physical conditions has made building and maintaining road networks difficult.

The Lena Highway, for example, nicknamed the “Highway from Hell,” is a federal highway running 1,235 km (767 mi) north to south in eastern Siberia. It was just a dirt road until 2014, often turning into an impassible, muddy swamp in summer. Figure 3.15: Abandoned Apartment Buildings in Kadykchan, Russia (© Laika ac, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0) Under Vladimir Putin, Russia’s 2nd and 4th president, Russia’s economy has grown consistently, aided by high oil prices and global oil demand.

Putin also instituted police and military reforms, and persecuted some of the wealthy oligarchs who had taken control of private enterprises. Critics also note that Putin has enacted a number of laws seeking to quiet political dissent and personal freedoms.

There have been numerous documented cases of the torture of prisoners and members of the armed forces as well as a number of suspicious killings of journalists and lawmakers. Although the Cold War officially ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, tension between Russia and the West remains high.

Military conflict in the former Soviet states, like Ukraine, has often reignited simmering hostilities. Still, there is some evidence of cooperation. In 2015, Putin told fellow world leaders that climate change was “one of the gravest challenges humanity is facing” and backed the United Nation’s climate change agreement.

Why is Russia a pro natalist country?

Abstract – Population decline in modern day Russia is alarmingly steep: Russia loses approximately 750 thousand people each year. To combat population decline, the Russian government instituted aggressive pro-natalist policies. The paper evaluates the capacity of new policies to change women’s reproductive behavior using a socio-institutionalist theoretical framework, which analyzes the gendered interaction between the states, the labor market, and family.

What has been the leading factor in the declining population of Russia?

Abstract— – The article examines the current demographic trends in Russia as compared to population changes in the world and its major regions based on data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Eurostat, and the UN Population Division.

1. It is shown that in terms of a number of characteristics of population reproduction—low fertility, ageing population structure, natural population decline—Russia is quite similar to the developed countries group.
2. However, Russia is behind many countries in reducing the mortality rate of the middle-aged and older population, especially in men, and, correspondingly, in life expectancy for all age groups, which results in a noticeable increase in natural population decline and in deformation of the sex structure of the population.

The specifics of the age structure of the Russian population that have been formed by a number of demographic waves are such that changes in the number of births and in age group sizes come in waves; this trend will continue in the coming decades. The article also analyzes excess mortality in Russia during the COVID-19 pandemic in comparison with similar data for the European Union (EU-27) and compares healthy life expectancy estimates for Russia, the entire world, individual countries, and different groups of countries by income.

Keywords: Russia, population growth, natural population decline, migration-based population growth, population ageing, fertility, life expectancy Introduction. Analyzing and forecasting demographic trends is the constant focus of attention of researchers of demographics and other related disciplines.

Forecasting changes in the size and structure of the population is a necessary component of economic and social forecasts. Some demographic characteristics serve as important indicators of socioeconomic well-being (infant mortality, life expectancy) and are included, for example, in the human potential index.

Population decline, which has become a stable trend in Russia, is cause for serious concern, and that incentivizes research into possible ways to save the population and restore its well-being, Demographers first raised the alarm about the threat of depopulation back in the 1970s, when the fertility dropped to an extremely low level that could not ensure simple generation replacement,

Extensive discussions of demographic challenges and risks for socioeconomic development continued in the following years, The demographic situation in Russia is constantly monitored by various research centers. The most long-standing records are the annual Naselenie Rossii (Population of Russia) reports that in 1993–2006 were issued by the Center for Demography and Human Ecology of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences and are now (since 2007) issued by the Vishnevsky Institute of Demography of the Higher School of Economics.1 When analyzing demographic trends, researchers often use cross-country comparisons to substantiate their interpretations and forecasts.

Entire separate research areas are dedicated to global demographic shifts, demographic problems of the global North and South, changes in the global population structure that are associated with risks of aggravation of the problems of coexistence of civilizations whose differences lie more in their religious and cultural mindsets than in economics or political regimes,

It seems worthwhile to analyze the population dynamics in Russia in the context of global trends, thereby identifying the country’s place in the global population and deviations of its key indicators of population reproduction from the global average.

These comparisons will be based on data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and estimates used in the UN system of organizations that have since 1950 been regularly issued by the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The results of the last completed, 26th cycle of calculations were presented in the summer of 2019 and therefore do not account for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The long-term trend of natural population decline and reduction of the population size in Russia. The trend of population decline has been observed in Russia since 1993, when the number of Russian residents reached its maximum value of 148.6 million people.

In 2009–2017, the trend was interrupted by moderate growth, but in 2018 the decline resumed. According to Rosstat, on January 1, 2022, the population of Russia was 145.6 million people, having decreased since the beginning of 2021 by 612.8 thousand people, or 0.4%.2 The main reason for the population decline is the fact that the fertility consistently remains at below-replacement level, leading to natural decline.

The number of deaths in Russia has been exceeding the number of births since 1992. The situation was the most acute in 1999–2002, when natural decline reached almost a million people per year (the highest value was 959 thousand people, or 6.6‰ which was recorded in 2000 3 ).

Although the rate of the decline decreased in subsequent years and in 2013–2016 there even was a small natural increase, 4 after that the number of deaths began to exceed the number of births once again. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020 the natural population decline was more than double that of 2019, 702 thousand people, or –4.8‰.

In 2021, it increased to 1043 thousand people, or ‒7.2‰, surpassing the 2000 value. In the context of the steady and long-term natural decline trend, the decisive factor of population changes in Russia is migration-based growth. Since 1993, it has become virtually the only factor of population growth in Russia (with the exception of 2013–2016), partially compensating for the natural decline and in some years leading to overall population growth (1994, 2009–2017).

• Overall, between 1993 and 2021 the population of Russia (excluding Crimea) decreased by 15.4 million people due to natural decline and increased by 10.0 million people due to net-migration.
• All realistic forecasts predict that the trend of natural population decline will continue in the coming years: according to the average and low versions of the Rosstat forecast, 5 it will continue for the next 15 years, according to UN prospects, until 2050, although the intensity will vary.

Russia is far from the only country with population dynamics defined by the persistent below-replacement fertility. In the future, the trend long-term of natural population decline is expected to spread to more and more countries. According to UN estimates, in the second half of the 20th century natural population decline was first recorded in 1970–1975 in Germany and Luxembourg; in Germany, the trend persists to this day.

1. In subsequent years, the number of countries characterized by such decline increased to four, in 1990–1995 to thirteen, most of these countries being European.
2. In some periods the group was joined by countries that had suffered significant losses as a result of genocide a population group (Cambodia in 1975–1980, Rwanda in 1990–1995), but in these countries the natural decline trend did not become long-term.

In 2015–2020 the number of countries characterized by natural population decline increased to 23, and in the medium term their number is expected to continue to increase at an accelerated pace, since the birth rate is declining in most countries where it used to be high, and in some cases the decline is rapid (Iran, Ireland).

1. The key reasons for this decline are the inverse correlation of the fertility level and the country’s levels of well-being, education, and women’s economic participation.
2. But even in comparison with the growing number of (mostly developed 6 ) countries characterized by natural population decline, in Russia in some periods this process is particularly intense, despite partial compensation by net-migration.

Since the middle of the 20th century, the average annual population growth rate in Russia has been lower than the global average and closest to the indicators of the developed countries category ( Fig.1 ). However, while for this group of countries the trend is a gradual decline in population growth rates, in Russia they changed in waves and with significant deviations from the trend. Fig.1. Average annual population growth rates, the world, the major groups of countries, and Russia, 1950–2020: — Russia; - - - the world; –◇– developed countries; –◼– least developed countries; –⚫– developing countries excluding the least developed. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019).

1. World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition.
2. The global population growth rate is also decreasing, but for now remains high (over 1.1% per year in 2015–2020), which is associated with risks for sustainable development,
3. The share of the population of the developed countries characterized by decreased growth rates, and in the near future likely also by population decline, is steadily declining and is expected to continue declining.

Aging of the population of Russia, increase in the demographic burden of older age groups, and waveform deformations of the age structure of the population. The number of births and deaths largely depends on the age and sex structure of the population.

In addition to the global trend of an increasing share of older age groups caused by the decreased fertility and increased life expectancy, the population of Russia is also characterized by long-term preservation of waveform deformation of the age structure, as well as significant imbalances of the sex structure in older age groups.

These deformations were caused by several demographic waves. The wave that is relevant for the current population is the replacement of sparsely populated generations born during the Great Patriotic War by populous generations of the 1950s and early 1960s.

The children of the sparsely populated wartime generation were born in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, the grandchildren in the 1990s. The influence of this demographic wave is likely to continue until the end of this century, manifesting primarily as waveform changes in the sizes of major age groups and the numbers of births and marriages.

According to Rosstat, 7 at the beginning of 2021 children under the age of 15 made up 17.7% of the Russian population (the lowest value, 14.8%, was observed in 2006–2007), while elderly people (65 and older) made up 15.8% (this share had once again increased since 2010, when it was 12.7%).

• For comparison, note that 30 years ago children under the age of 15 made up 22.7% and elderly people over 65, 10.6% of the country’s population.
• Until recently, the age-dependency ratio in Russia had been decreasing, dropping from 768 people under and over the working age per 1000 working-age people in 1992 to 586 in 2007.

That decrease was mainly due to a decrease in the burden of the younger age groups (from 426 to 256), while the decrease in the burden of older age groups was not significant (from 341 to 326 in 2006). After the economically favourable period known as the “demographic dividend,” the age-dependency ratio began to increase rapidly: to 830 people under (343) and over (487) the working age per 1000 working-age people.

The demographic burden on the working-age population is expected to continue increasing in the future, mainly due to the increasing number of elderly people, which creates new challenges for the development of the social protection, healthcare, and long-term care systems and increases the relevance of measures aimed at increasing active longevity.

In terms of the age structure of the population, Russia is noticeably different from both global indicators and those of the major groups of countries ( Fig.2 ). The age structures of the total population of the developed countries is also somewhat wavelike, but in Russia the waves are more pronounced. Fig.2. Age structure of the population by 5-year age groups, the world, the major groups of countries, and Russia, 2020: — Russia; – – – the world; –◇– developed countries; –◼– least developed countries; –⚫– developing countries excluding the least developed.

• Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019).
• World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition.
• Compared to the global population and to the developing countries, the population of Russia is older.
• Young people under 20 make up 33% of the global population and 49% of the populations of the developing countries, while people 65 years and older make up 9 and 4% respectively.

The young age structure of the global population, especially in the least developed countries, represents a significant potential for growth that will ensure population increases in the coming decades even if the global birth rate falls to or below the level of simple population reproduction.

• In contrast, the older age structure of the developed countries in general and Russia specifically will slow population growth down,
• According to UN projections, in 2020–2050 the inertia of the older age structure (population momentum) alone will decrease the population of Europe by 6%,
• Consistently low birth rate.

In recent decades, Russia has seen alternating declines and rises in the number of births, with the downward trend being predominant. These fluctuations are associated in part with the waveform deformations of the age structure (specifically with changes in the number of women of reproductive age), in part with changes in the intensity of the fertility and its age profile.

1. The last observed period of increasing in the number of births occurred in 2000–2014, when the increase was almost 1.6-fold (from 1215 thousand people in 1999 to 1913 thousand people in 2014, excluding Crimea).
2. However, this indicator remained lower than in 1971–1990 (during that period its greatest value was 2500 thousand people in 1987).

Since 2015, the trend of a declining number of births has resumed. In 2021, it decreased to 1380 thousand people (1403 thousand people with Crimea), or 9.6‰, which is noticeably lower than in 2012–2015 (over 13‰). In 1999, the total fertility rate 8 —the indicator usually used as an integral characteristic of fertility, in particular for the purposes of social policy and forecasting—fell to the lowest value recorded in modern Russia, 1.157.

The level necessary for simple population reproduction at modern mortality rates is almost double that (conventionally taken as 2.1 children per woman). In 2000–2015, the total fertility rate increased (with the exception of 2005), reaching 1.777 by 2015, which roughly corresponds to the level of the early 1990s, but is 15% lower than required for simple population reproduction.

In 2016, the indicator started to decline again, and in 2019 it dropped to 1.504, 15% less than in 2015 and 28% lower than required for simple population reproduction. In 2020, the total fertility rate remained at almost the same level of 1.505. Globally, the total fertility rate has decreased from about five children per woman in the 1950s and 1960s to 2.4 in 2020 ( Fig.3 ). Fig.3. Total fertility rate, the world, the major groups of countries, and Russia, 1950–2020: — Russia; – – – the world; –◇– developed countries; –◼– least developed countries; –⚫– developing countries excluding the least developed. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019).

1. World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition.
2. The extremely low values of total fertility rate observed at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries in Russia as well as almost all Eastern European countries were largely due to changes in the age profile of fertility, shifts in the calendar of births, and the increased mean age of mothers at childbearing (primarily at first birth).

The average age at which Russian women gave birth increased to 28.8 years in 2020. The average age at which women had their first child increased to 25.9 years in 2018–2020. Compare this with the average age at which a mother gives birth to her first child in half of the EU-27 countries, where it is already over 29 years, and in some even over 31 years (in Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg, according to 2019 data).9 During periods of such significant shifts in fertility rates, assessments based on calendar indicators of total fertility for individual years (for the corresponding notional generations) may not be entirely reliable,

• Even given the same total fertility level, forecasting results significantly depend on the age profile,
• Therefore, assessing long-term prospects requires using indicators of real generations (cohorts of certain birth years).
• The comleted fertility rate of generations of Russian women who have aged out of childbearing age also indicates a decrease, but a more moderate one: women born in 1960–1964 gave birth to an average of 1.76 children, women born in 1965–1969 to an average of 1.64.

The future comleted fertility rate of women born in 1970–1974 is estimated at 1.60, in 1975–1979 at 1.65, and in the 1980s at 1.73–1.75 children per woman, The average number of births calculated for single-year generations of Russian women born in 1960–1980 varies within approximately the same range: from 1.58 children per woman born in 1973 to 1.86 per woman born in 1960,

In general, fertility rates for both notional and real generations in Russia show a tendency to stabilize at the average level typical of advanced economies, For the entire period since 1960, the total fertility rate in Russia has varied within the minimax limits of this indicator’s variation in the developed countries, which in the last two decades ranged from 1.3 to 2.1 births per woman.

Decreases in the total fertility rate of real generations were observed during this period in all developed countries, and only in a few such countries it still exceeds the level required for simple population reproduction in generations that have recently completed the reproductive cycle (in the 1965–1969 birth year cohorts in New Zealand, Macedonia, Ireland, and the United States).

In Russia the completed birth rate dropped below replacement level as early as in the 1955–1959 birth year cohorts. Lag in life expectancy. In the conditions of consistently low birth rate and natural population decline, the strategy of saving the population by reducing the mortality rate and increasing healthy life expectancy gains particular importance.

Its urgency and relevance are indicated by Russia’s noticeable lag in these characteristics of population reproduction compared to many other countries. In the 1960s–2000s, the predominant trend in Russia was an increasing number of deaths and crude mortality rate, caused by both the aging of the population and an increase in the intensity of mortality.

The increase was particularly rapid in 1992–1994, 1999–2003. The largest number of deaths within this period was recorded in 2003, when it amounted to 2366 thousand people, or 16.4‰. After 2003, these indicators tended to decline, with small deviations from the trend. In 2019, the number of deaths registered in Russia was the lowest since 1992 at 1766 thousand people (excluding Crimea), almost a quarter less than the 2003 number (with Crimea, the number of deaths in 2019 was 1798 thousand people).

The crude mortality rate decreased to 12.2‰ (12.3‰ with Crimea). The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 increased the number of deaths to almost 2139 thousand people (2102 thousand people excluding Crimea), a 19% increase compared to 2019. In 2021, the number of deaths continued to increase, exceeding not only the 2020 value (by 15% according to short-term data for January–December), but even the peak of 2003 (by 1.5%), at 2445 thousand people (2402 thousand people excluding Crimea).

The crude mortality rate increased to 14.5‰ in 2020 and to 16.8‰ in 2021. The indicator had never before reached such values in the entire period of observation since the 1960s. The previous highest points were a little over 16‰ in 2002–2003 and 2005. The 2020 increase in all age specific death rates except for children (under 10 years) and adolescents (15–19 years old).

An especially significant increase—20% or more—was observed for ages 65–85. The death rate for this group has “rolled back” to almost the level of 2010. As a result, life expectancy at birth, 10 the indicator most often used to analyze and forecast mortality, decreased by 1.8 years, falling once again to 71.5 years, which only slightly exceeds the 2015 level.

The steady growth trend that had been forming since 2004 was interrupted. Life expectancy at birth reached its highest value for Russia, 73.3 years, in 2019. That is 8.5 years longer than in 2003, but only 3.2 years longer than the previous best recorded in 1986–1987, over thirty years ago. Thus, the increase in life expectancy observed in 2004–2019 was initially a recovery of previous positions.

The landmark milestone of 70 years was exceeded for the second time in 2012. Back in the mid-1960s, life expectancy at birth in Russia approached, but did not reach that level (69.6 years according to estimates for 1964–1965). The growth trend came back only in the 1980s, when, according to data for 1986–1987, life expectancy at birth increased to 70.1 years.

However, the growth did not continue; on the contrary, it was followed by a decline, at first moderate, then sharper, down to 63.8 years in 1994. A short period of growth was once again followed by a recession (to 64.8 years in 2003), and only in 2004 did a more stable growth trend begin to form. At the current time it is still difficult to predict how rapid will the recovery growth phase and return to previously achieved levels of life expectancy be after the COVID-19 pandemic.

Life expectancy at birth in Russia has been below the average for the developed countries throughout the entire period since the middle of the 20th century ( Fig.4 ). Fig.4. Life expectancy at birth, both sexes, the world, the major groups of countries, and Russia, 1950–2020: — Russia; - - - the world; –◇– developed countries; –◼– least developed countries; –⚫– developing countries excluding the least developed. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019).

1. World Mortality Report 2019. CD-ROM.
2. The lag was smallest in 1960–1965, when it amounted to 1.6 years (67.9 compared to 69.5), and largest, 10.6 years, in 2000–2005 (67.1 compared to 76.9).
3. During this period life expectancy at birth in Russia was lower compared not only to the global average (68.9), but also to the developing countries (68.7).

In 2015–2020, life expectancy at birth in Russia reached the global average level (72.3 years) 11 and the lag behind the average for the developed countries decreased to 7 years. The lag behind specifically the European Union (EU-28, with the UK ) was largest in 2000–2005, when it was almost 13 years (77.8 compared to 65.0 in Russia).

In 2015–2020, the gap narrowed to 8.7 years (81.0 in the EU28 compared to 72.3 in Russia). The mortality in Russia is characterized by an exceptionally large gap in life expectancy between women and men. At the highest, according to Rosstat data, level of this indicator in 2019, life expectancy at birth was 68.2 years for men and 78.2 years for women (in 2020 it was 66.5 and 76.4 respectively).

The difference between women’s and men’s life expectancy at birth is about 10 years, and only several years earlier it was 13 years or more (57.4 and 71.1 in 1994, 58.9 and 72.5 in 2005). In the late 1980s, this gap was noticeably smaller at 9.6 years (1986–1988).

According to UN estimates, in 1960–1965 life expectancy at birth in Russia was almost 17 years higher than the global average (67.9 compared to 51.2 years). This difference was especially pronounced for women, amounting to 18.5 years (71.4 compared to 52.9), and less so for men, 13.5 years (63.1 compared to 49.6).

However, over the next 20 years the values of these indicators in Russia remained almost the same, while globally they exhibited steady growth ( Fig.5 ). Fig.5. Life expectancy at birth (e0) by sex, the world and Russia, 1950–2020: –▲– Russia, men; –⚫– Russia, women; –△– the world, men; –⚪– the world, women. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition.

In the 1990s, the life expectancy for Russian men began to lag more and more behind the global average: at first the difference was not very significant, but in 2000–2005 it reached 6.2 years (58.6 compared to 64.8). The global life expectancy for women also almost caught up to the Russian average, with the difference having decreased to 2.6 years.

In 2015–2020, life expectancy at birth for Russian women was 2.8 years higher than the global average (77.5 compared to 74.7), while for Russian men it remained 3.1 years lower than the global average (66.8 compared to 69.9). The most favorable trends: declining infant and child mortality.

The increases in life expectancy at birth in Russia were until recently ensured mainly by declining child and infant mortality. Over the past thirty years, child mortality under the age of 5 has decreased from 21‰ in 1990 to 5.5‰ in 2020. Infant mortality, despite some fluctuations associated mainly with the transition to international live birth criteria, has also decreased: in 2020 it was 4.5‰ compared to 18–19‰ in the late 1980s and 15‰ in 2000.

This was largely due to the success in reducing neonatal (within the first month after birth), primarily early neonatal (within the first 7 days after birth) mortality. There is potential for further decreasing infant mortality through reducing currently excessively high post-neonatal (within 2–12 months after birth) and late neonatal (within 8–27 days after birth) mortality rates compared to the modern trend, Fig.6. Child mortality, the world, the major groups of countries, and Russia, 1950–2020: — Russia; - - - the world; –◇– developed countries; –◼– least developed countries; –⚫– developing countries excluding the least developed. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019).

World Mortality Report 2019. CD-ROM. Slight progress in increasing life expectancy for older age groups. The dynamics of the death rate of the middle-aged and older population is not clear-cut: in the 1990s it increased significantly, leading to a noticeable decrease in life expectancy, especially for men.

Thus, the life expectancy for 20-year-old men under the mortality rate of 1995 was about the same as 100 years ago (0.1 years less than in 1896–1897). At age 40, it was 1.6 years less, at age 60, 0.8 years less, at age 80, 1.6 years less ( Table 1 ).